HMONG CIA SPECIAL FORCES-LIMASITE 85-CIA WANTED 100 HMONG AND 100 CIA COMPUTER TECHS TO STOP 50000 VIETCONG TROOPS-FINALLY CIA BOMBED OWN BASE TO STONE AGE-NOTE SMALL HMONG BOY IN BACKGROUND-CIA USED CHILD SOLDIERS TO FIGHT COMMUNISM
Photo courtesy of Lt/Col Jeannie Schiff USAF (ret)
202642N 1034305E (UH65496355) Phou Pha Thi, Laos
In the later half of 1966, the idea was conceived to install a Radar Bombing Control System (MSQ-77) at TACAN Channel 97 (Site 85) in Laos. The MSQ-77 is a sophisticated piece of electronic equipment to direct air strikes without the pilot actually seeing his target. The advantages being 1) that the aircraft can fly at an altitude reachable only by Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) and 2) bombing can be accomplished in all types of weather day or night. The advantages were obvious, but the political obstacles were going to be difficult. Laos was a neutral country. Placing this equipment in northern Laos would imply that Laos was allowing another country to use their country to mount an attack on a neighbor, which had recognized their neutrality. But this neighboring country, North Vietnam, was using their soil to transport men, equipment and supplies through the Laos panhandle into Cambodia and South Vietnam (Ho Chi Min Trail).
March 11, 1968, Site 85 was overrun by PAVN commandos. Eleven of the nineteen brave men on Phou Pha Thi (site85) were KIA/BNR or POW/MIA, no bodies or remains have ever been found. This was the largest single ground combat loss of USAF personnel during the Vietnam war.
A series of Telegrams and Memorandums are used to develop the story of the unnecessary Tragedy at Site 85.
Below is a telegram from CINCPAC to the Chairman JCS. Dated February 25, 1967.
278. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Honolulu, February 25, 1967, 0152Z. /1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Jan-31 Mar 1967. Top Secret. Repeated to Westmoreland and General John D. Ryan, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force. 250152Z. Installation of MSQ 77 in northern Laos (S). A. CINCPAC 282347Z Nov 66 (Genser). B. OUSAIRA Vientiane AIRA/EMB 01834/291055Z Nov 66 (Genser)./2/ /2/Neither reference has been found, but they are summarized in the text below.
1. A front channel message which I have just released provides the military rationale and the necessity of installing an MSQ-77 at Site 85 in Laos.
2. In November CINCPACAF requested authorization to develop a concept and plan for installation of an MSQ-77 in northern Laos and authorization to discuss this matter with Ambassador Sullivan. Ref A authorized CINCPACAF to proceed with plans as requested and directed that AmEmb Vientiane be provided with detailed requirements. Ref A further urged the Ambassador's concurrence in this proposal and assistance in selection of a suitable site. Ref B stated that Ambassador Sullivan's view of installation of MSQ on Lao territory was decidedly negative, but would authorize his representatives to discuss proposal with PACAF representatives. He further doubted that RLG would be willing to accept such a major installation for which they would consequently feel security obligations beyond their means.
3. In early December Gen Harris/3/ sent a message to Ambassador Sullivan stating that due to the urgency of this proposal and potential impact on the success of our air operations in RT and BR he welcomed the opportunity to provide a briefing to him at Udorn on 10 December 1966. His response again restated his grave doubts that RLG would be willing to permit installation of MSQ-77 in Lao territory and that he had even graver doubts that Washington would even authorize him to propose such an installation to the RLG. Nevertheless, the Ambassador agreed to meet PACAF representatives at Udorn and attend briefing. /3/General Hunter Harris, then the Commander of the Pacific Air Force.
4. At the briefing Ambassador expressed keen interest in the tactical merits of an MSQ in northern Laos but again stated that he had misgivings about its political acceptability. He expressed concern that the RLG would most likely term such an installation as an indication that they would in fact be proving direct support to offensive operations against NVN rather than maintaining a neutral position and taking defensive action only. No commitment was made by Ambassador that he would provide further support to this proposal.
5. I discussed the subject with him during his visit en route to Washington. He again emphasized his previous views. It appears that he did not intend to give his full support to this proposal at State level. Due to the significant increase in air operations capability which this MSQ will provide, I believe we must attempt to obtain approval.
6. The information contained in my Genser message is a condensed version of PACAF briefing and plan for implementation. It has been concluded that we can support this plan. I understand that HQ USAF has already taken action to repackage MSQ-77 equipment for this type development and if not used as proposed, it will still be valuable for contingency purposes. If go ahead is received, we can have this MSQ in operation in 30-45 days.
7. In summary, from a military viewpoint an MSQ located in northern Laos would greatly enhance our air campaign against the enemy. This is no cure-all by any means, but we must do more now to increase the effectiveness of our air operations in the northern area. The Ambassador's original objection was based on doubts about the security of site which we have overcome to some degree as expressed in other message. However, his later objections, which shifted to the political angle, may or may not be completely valid. This is something that will have to be flushed out at other levels.
The dialog continued and plans were being developed. Then on May 1, 1967 the following memorandum from the Laotian Ambassador (Sullivan) was sent to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy).
283. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, May 1, 1967. /1/Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Far East, General. Top Secret. SUBJECT Limitations on Military Actions in Laos 1. You asked me to set out in a paper my estimate of the limitations which face us with respect to extending military actions, both ground and air, in Laos. I will list by subheading those various items which have been proposed or contemplated, and give you my current best judgment with respect to each.
3. Air Action
A. Overflights. Despite the Soviet protest and the probable ICC action on US overflights of Laos, I think Souvanna will hold the line and permit these to continue. The one exception to this would be B-52 overflights. For some reason which is hard to define (perhaps the nuclear capability) overflights by B-52's carry much more propaganda wallop than overflights by fighter bombers. The political and propaganda repercussions of such overflights are in my judgment far greater than the limited marginal operational gain. In short, the 20 minutes to an hour which we would save by overflying Laos rather than going south of Cambodia are just not worth the consequences. Therefore, I believe we should hold the line in running our B-52's from Utapao south of Cambodia. The B-52's which come from Guam will continue to execute the bulk of the raids in Laos in any event. I am not convinced that there is such a crying need for flexibility that we must change this pattern. Consequently, we must avoid public acknowledgment of B-52 activity in Laos and we must guarantee no slippage by preventing B-52 overflights from Utapao.
B. Air Seeding. As I indicated above, air seeding can be done provided we characterize it as a continuing part of our interdiction campaign and don't label it a barrier. As a matter of fact we have already done some air seeding in Laos and I have Souvanna's concurrence in it. Therefore, if we handle this one correctly it presents no problems. If we get the issues all tangled up with barriers it could cause many great difficulties in attempting to obtain Souvanna's concurrence.
C. MSQ-77. Air Forces wishes to install MSQ-77 at site 85. I am having further discussions with Air Force Secretary Brown and Chief of Staff McConnell today. In general, I think Souvanna would reject this if it were put to him honestly. He has agreed to the installation of the navigational devices in Laos and we have installed TACAN's on Lao soil. However, the TACAN is a passive device. The MSQ-77 is a command radar which takes positive control of air strikes in North Vietnamese territory. Moreover, it involves several buildings and about 40 men. It would be very conspicuous. I wonder if it is worth it.
Site 85's location in northern Laos was roughly 120 Miles from Hanoi, or the distance between San Diego and Los Angeles, CA. The existence and location of Site 85 was declassified in 1983.
A little over a month later, June 3, 1967, a Telegram was received at the Embassy in Laos from The Department of State. It looked like the political problems could be worked out to everyone's satisfaction.
290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, June 3, 1967, 12:15 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LAOS-US. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Hamilton; cleared by Aldrich, Habib, and Steadman; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. 207815. Subject: MSQ-77. For Ambassador from Kohler.
1. We have carefully reviewed JCS request for MSQ-77 installation at Phu Thi (Site 85),/2/ in light your judgment of political risks and liabilities for us and Souvanna, expressed in previous correspondence and during your consultations, and of renewed DOD affirmation of need and urgency to achieve maximum effectiveness in air operations over North Vietnam. /2/As reported in telegram 194052 to Vientiane, May 13. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 2. Unless you perceive new factors not previously taken into account, I would like you to discuss this matter with Souvanna at earliest time you judge opportune. To minimize possibility of damage to our essential relationship with him, you should present proposal as an idea we are considering--with view to obtaining his acquiescence but short of making direct request for authority. You should note that basic function of this installation--like others on SEA mainland--would be precise navigational control of aircraft; that MSQ-77 is a quantum jump beyond TACAN facilities already emplaced within Laos; and that USAF has necessary equipment and personnel for immediate installation. Such a facility may have appeal to Souvanna with respect to US operations in Laos (though we are aware that you believe tactical changes would in fact be minimal at least initially). You will, of course, have to acknowledge capability of system to direct air strikes against North Vietnam. In other words, you should avoid both exclusive concentration on offensive use against North Vietnam of ground installation in Laos and dissimulation that would jeopardize our relationship of candor and trust in event we decide to approve emplacement and installation should ultimately be exposed./3/
/3/In telegram 7712 from Vientiane, June 14, Sullivan reported he had discussed hypothetically the question of MSQ-77 with Souvanna the morning of June 14. Souvanna's reaction was "cautious, but generally positive." If the unit were to be installed, Souvanna suggested that it must be done without his knowledge. Technicians servicing the site would have to be civilians or military personnel with civilian documentation. The site would need to be camouflaged both physically and electronically, and would need demolition units attached for emergency use. (Ibid., DEF 15 LAOS-US)
3. If Souvanna does not object and you can now agree to positioning of MSQ-77 at Site 85, you may wish to provide your judgment as to whether USAF personnel need be under shallow cover and on any necessary restriction on pattern of crew rotation by helo.
4. I plan to review this proposal with the Secretary on basis of your report.
Rusk
The Telegram from Ambassador Sullivan to The Department of State on June 14, 1967 indicated that Souvanna would cautiously go along with the installation of an MSQ-77 at Site 85. A Telegram from The Department of State on June 29, 1967 to the Embassy in Laos gives the go ahead for the installation if new objections are not brought forth by Souvanna.
294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, June 29, 1967, 4:43 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 17 LAOS-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Hamilton; cleared with Habib, Rear Admiral Lemos of DOD/ISA, Arzac, Salans, and Brigadier General Dobson of the Joint Staff, J-3; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. 218801. MSQ-77. Refs: A. State 207815./2/ B. Vientiane 7712./3/ Joint State/Defense message. /2/Document 290. /3/See footnote 3, Document 290.
Part One: For Vientiane
1. We are pleased that Souvanna reflects a generally positive attitude about MSQ-77 installation in Laos. His concerns are fully understood and, except with respect to location, those mentioned in Ref. B can be allayed:
a. Souvanna's position that he would wish to be able to deny knowledge of installation is understandable. If facility were to be exposed, we would propose to acknowledge presence of navigational aid in area where such facility woefully deficient. In such circumstance, is it likely that Souvanna would be willing to acknowledge in general that US has provided navigational aids to RLG, so that question in fact directed toward MSQ-77 might be dealt with by allusion to TACANS which we understand Souvanna has approved for use in Laos? We hope in any event that Souvanna would hold in abeyance any comment on "violation" until nature of disclosure precisely known and could be discussed.
b. USAF personnel will operate facility, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
c. Equipment would be prepared for emergency destruction at time of installation. In event of communist attack, we will wish to count on Vang Pao for vigorous defense long enough to evacuate personnel but not, if pressure heavy, for defense of equipment.
d. Previous communications should provide basis for assurances that every feasible measure will be taken for physical and electronic camouflage.
2. Taking into account technical requirements (primarily line-of- sight feature and range of system) and security and low visibility requirements, it remains Washington judgment that Site 85 is not only best but only feasible location. We have understood your analysis supported this judgment. Unless you have alternate proposal we could quickly review, believe justification for this selection must stand.
3. Secretary Rusk has determined that military requirement justifies accepting potential political liabilities and we are hopeful Souvanna will understand basis on which this difficult decision made. In light contradiction (Ref B) between Souvanna's desire for reassurances on specific points and his wish not to know what we are doing, will have to leave to your judgment how best to bring him to awareness that we have taken his concerns (which we share) fully into account in reaching decision to proceed. Advise action taken to square your account with him.
Part Two: For JCS
4. Unless report requested from Vientiane in para 3 above indicates new objection, you may proceed installation of MSQ-77 at Site 85, subject to coordination of arrangements for installation and continuing support with US Ambassador Vientiane by appropriate USAF authority.
For TACAN operations, we are put on a seven day rotation. Seven on site and seven in Udorn. Of course this is totally dependent on weather conditions along the way, and North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao activity. Security was provided for us by the Hmong living on the mountain and General Vang Pao's troops at the base of the mountain. Also a Thai PARU (Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit) crew a few yards from us. Shortly after getting operational, we were warned that an attack was likely to happen that night. The PARU, instead of going on a search and destroy, hid in our tent. Because of that Gary tried to get the Thai removed from the mountain. That was unsuccessful.
Thai PARU with Lt. Gary Boros
Everyone considered the place impenetrable. The TACAN was on top and a sheer drop on three sides. The Hmong were armed with everything including cross bows and hand made flintlock rifles. NO way are the North Vietnamese or Pathet Lao going to make it to our site.
Our rotating teams consisted of two people per team. Wally and Larry on one team, Bob and I on the other. Gary remained as part of the team until after Thanksgiving when the Page Communications people took over. Gary alternated rotation with me and when in Udorn he often slept in the Comm Group office because he was playing poker many of the nights. He was supposed to have returned to Udorn to meet a team taking a TACAN into the panhandle of Laos but weather kept them socked in until after Thanksgiving. Gary recalls a little pig running around the camp site that suddenly disappeared and we then found out that among our Thanksgiving delights were marinated pig entrails. For better fare, when in Udorn we often ate at the "Wolverine" restaurant and enjoyed their "Kobe" steaks.
Several times we were "buzzed" by aircraft. We would call Vientiane to confirm friendly. No friendlies in the area and friendlies would have been at a much higher altitude. Fighters would be scrambled to check things out. As I recall, there was an airborne command post in a C-47, call sign "DOGPATCH". Believe he had some sort of RADAR on board and could plot the locations of the aircraft.
On our normal rotation days we would bring our Petroleum, for the generators, with us. POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants) was either picked up at 20, 20Alt or 36.
Landing
Phou Pha Thi,
our home away from home
We arrived at Phou Pha Thi and the TACAN was dropped at the top of the mountain.
The natives had taken about 20 meters off the top of the mountain to create a level place for the NAVAIDS equipment. After dropping the TACAN, the Chinooks landed in a clearing about 1000 yards down hill.
The Hmong had built a frame and floor for the tent. They had just finished pulling the canvas over the frame (a 32 man tent) the day we arrived for work. A major chore out of the way.
The next major chore was to lay the power lines UP the hill to the TACAN. With the help of the Hmong, a path was cleared and the cable pulled up.
The jungle was pretty thick and at the top, there were a lot of rocks we had to climb over.
Eventually all the cable is in place.
Again, with the aid of the Hmong, the three diesel generators were put in their positions.
Wally and Larry at the TACAN, Larry and myself at the generators... Fire one up and put Channel 97, code name "Clara", on the air...OPERATIONAL!!
Installation of the TSQ-81 at Phou Pha Thi Lima Site 85, Laos
Photos Courtesy of Lt/Col Douglas Farnsworth unless otherwise noted
In April of 1967 the Air Force issued a contract to The Reeves Instrument Corporation based in New York to develop a mobile, light weight, air transportable version of the MSQ-77 Radar Bombing Control System to be called the TSQ-81. Within a few months the first unit was Sent to a government airfield in Bryan Texas for testing/bug fixes and practice assembly/disassembly.
It was then shipped to NKP (Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand) and became TSQ-81 code name "BROMO".
Photos Courtesy of Col. Gerald Clayton
The second unit was sent to Bryan for evaluation. It passed testing and was designated TSQ-81 Serial Number 13. The equipment, housed in two 12x9x40 foot metal shelters, was disassembled and transported to Udorn RTAFB in Thailand. This unit was destined to be installed at Lima Site 85, Laos, code name "COMMANDO CLUB"
Lt/Col Farnsworth comments: "Mid summer of 1967 I reported to Lt/Col Alan Randle at Barksdale and we immediately left for Austin, TX. On the drive down I received the only briefing I ever received regarding this project. Needless to say, the briefing was informal and lacking in detail. On arrival at the Bryan air strip I inspected the site, familiarized myself as best I could and asked lots of questions. The next morning Randle left for Barksdale after telling me to supervise the loading of the equipment and accompany it to Udorn. And to send the men home. The men who were to install the site were already in place in Laos. After arrival at Udorn I was given an Air America ID card. All other identification was left behind. The next day I was flown to the site by a Pony Express chopper." {Source: ltr Lt/Col Farnsworth to Dr. Timothy Castle 28 August 2000}
The installation started in August 1967. The installation crew was from Headquarters and various detachments of the (1st CEG) 1st Combat Evaluation Group. There were 20 members in this select group.
Lt/Col Doug Farnsworth, Hq CMSgt Andy Born, Hq SSgt Charles W. Pearman, Det 3 SSgt George J. Dotson, Det 4 SSgt Billy V. Wheat, Det 9 SSgt Bill C. Boyd, Det 7 SSgt Ralph E. Barnhart, Det 6 SSgt John L. Redfearn, Det 4 SSgt Larry T. Bean, Hq A1C Heinz A. Hardy, Det 4
A1C Johnny A. McLaughlin, Det 9 A1C Billy D. O'Dell, Det 9 A1C Edward W. Harkins, Det 3 A1C Robert L. Wood, Det 9 A1C Keith W. Johnson, Det 13 A1C John W. Pritchett Jr., Hq A1C Jon L. Ramsay, Ramey AFB, TDY A2C Thomas J. Flaherty Jr., Det 3 A2C Charles W. Long, Det 8 A2C Richard J. Colgan, Det 9
Lt/Col Farnsworth comments: "Shortly after arrival I became concerned with the men's living conditions. Too little attention had been given to the needs for water, rations and mail service. Much to my surprise we had no radios, no direct communications with Udorn. All communications were to be relayed by written message delivered by helicopter. In an emergency I could use a non-secure radio owned by Federal Electronics located in the TACAN maintenance shed. Neither method of communications was adequate or reliable. Even worse, there was absolutely no plan for evacuation in the event of hostile action or other emergency. I relayed my concern to 7/13 AF and Randle. In reply I was told, in so many words, not to worry. Our rations improved substantially when we started buying much of our food and having it delivered, courtesy of the Pony Express chopper pilots. Mail delivery was improved although it was screened. Water always remained a problem, although it need not have been". {Source: ltr Lt/Col Farnsworth to Dr. Timothy Castle 28 August 2000}
Left to right
CMSgt Andy Born
Lt/Col Doug Farnsworth
Lt/Col Farnsworth comments on this picture: "The small silver object below my left arm is a Pilatus Porter. An aircraft produced in Switzerland designed for STOL (Short Take Off and Landing). It was landing on a dirt strip just below the site". Lt/Col Farnsworth also points out that "the cliff behind us was a sheer drop off but climbable". This is an important comment to keep in mind when you read the story of the loss of this site. {Source: e-mail Lt/Col Farnsworth to Ron Haden 24 Jul 2002}
George Dotson (Deceased 8 Feb 1998)
Tom Flaherty
Bill Boyd
Johnny McLaughlin
Billy O'Dell
George Dotson
Johnny McLaughlin
Heinz Hardy
(Heinz reports that he gave his necklace to his youngest daughter in 2001)
BREAK TIME
Tom Flaherty (looking back), John McLaughlin, Billy O'Dell, George Dotson, Bill Boyd, Lt/Col Farnsworth, (Local)
Lt/Col Farnsworth comments on this picture: "I don't recall who the photographer was but am guessing that it was CMS Born. This pic was taken on the way back from the range marker. the marker was a several mile walk through some rather tough terrain. Especially tough since we all carried tools and various odds and ends we might need. we carefully followed the local and did not step off what passed for a trail. I questioned the local, who spoke very basic English, and he advised me that the area contained numerous landmines. I asked whose mines and he replied, many many peoples, Japanese, Chinese, American, NVA and Pathet Lao. Which is logical when you recall that this area has been fought over many times." [Webmaster note] I recall that when I first went to Lima Site 85 (late September '67) some of the trail from the chopper pad to the site was lined with yellow rope. We were cautioned not to venture beyond the rope for this same reason. It was also rumored that the Poppy fields were mined. I wasn't interested in Poppies anyway. "As I best remember we had stopped for a break on the way back from the marker at the locals insistence. His shack was a ways off the trail we had been using but he wanted us to see it and promised us a treat. I was somewhat apprehensive about the treat but it turned out to be a very old, rusty can of blueberries. I don't remember if he ever opened the can but I do remember we gave him cigarettes. We made several trips back to the range marker but this first time was the only time we employed the local. Born and I had agreed that we wanted to minimize as much as possible all contacts with the locals. We had been visited by several monks in their saffron robes but they did not impress us as being monks. However, we had to play it cool as we definitely did not wish to attract more attention by some unintended insult or affront to a religious entity". {Source: ltr Lt/Col Farnsworth to Ron Haden 25 Jul 2002}
